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🔍 Read the full analysis: Trezor’s Safe 5 Fix: What It Tackles And What It Leaves Unresolved on ThorstenMeyerAI.com

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TL;DR

Trezor confirmed three Safe 5 wallets bought from reseller CryptoBilis contained an added circuit board that copied recovery words and passphrases displayed on the device. Firmware 2.13.1, released November 11, blocks the implants Trezor has found, but cannot protect backups captured before installation; the company says no funds have been reported lost.

Trezor confirmed on November 12 that three of its Safe 5 hardware wallets, purchased through reseller CryptoBilis, contained an added circuit board designed to copy recovery words and passphrases shown on the screen. The company says firmware 2.13.1, released November 11 for four Trezor models, stops the implants it has identified from capturing data, but cannot protect a recovery backup collected before the update.

Trezor says the implant was fitted between the Safe 5’s main board and its screen. Its analysis found that the board copies information displayed on the screen, including recovery words shown when creating a wallet backup or entered when restoring one. It can also capture a passphrase when one appears. The implant encrypts the captured data and sends it over a mobile network to a server controlled by the attackers; if it cannot connect, it stores the data and retries, according to Trezor.

The company says the implant does not alter the wallet’s firmware or its Secure Element, a dedicated security chip. Trezor’s embedded team extracted and analyzed the implant’s firmware. The company describes the device as one that “only listens,” meaning it copies displayed information rather than changing the device’s operation.

The three confirmed Safe 5s were bought between August 20 and September 23, 2026, through CryptoBilis’s Tokopedia and Shopee stores or directly from the reseller. Trezor says one device was examined in its lab and two others were identified from owner-submitted photographs. It reports that 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward and are having their devices checked. The company says no owner of the three confirmed devices has reported losing funds, and that other devices it has checked showed no signs of tampering.

At a glance
updateWhen: Confirmed November 12, 2026; firmware 2…
The developmentTrezor confirmed three Safe 5 devices bought through CryptoBilis were physically implanted to capture information displayed on their screens and says firmware 2.13.1 blocks the known implants.

Trezor Safe 5 implant · how it works

What the hidden board copies, and what the fix stops

How Trezor describes the implant it found in three Safe 5 wallets bought from CryptoBilis, and what firmware 2.13.1 changes.

Inside the device (schematic)

Screen
Extra board (implant)copyingblocked
Main board, firmware, Secure Elementunchanged2.13.1

mobile network

Attackers’ server

Step by step

  1. 1Recovery words appear on the screen, when a wallet backup is created or a wallet is restored
  2. 2The extra board copies them, and a passphrase if one is shown. Firmware and Secure Element stay unchanged
  3. 3It encrypts the data and sends it over the mobile network. No connection: it keeps the data and retries
  4. 4Firmware 2.13.1, released Nov 11: stops the implants found so far from capturing anything

Confirmed

3 Safe 5 devices, bought Aug 20 – Sep 23, 2026 from CryptoBilis

Being checked

48 CryptoBilis buyers came forward; no tampering found at other resellers in the region

Funds lost

None reported so far, Trezor says

The fix can’t undo a leak: “the update can’t protect a wallet backup that was captured before it.” Trezor’s advice to CryptoBilis buyers stays: move funds to a new wallet with a new seed.

Source: Trezor, “Our CryptoBilis investigation: what we found and what we’ve changed”, Nov 12, 2026; Trezor firmware changelog (2.13.1, released Nov 11, 2026). Schematic drawing, not the real board layout.

Graphic: Powered by Thorsten Meyer AI

The Backup Risk Remains

The case targets information that can provide access to a wallet: its recovery words, and potentially a passphrase. Trezor says the implant reads what appears on the device screen and transmits it separately. This means that updating the wallet can stop the known capture method going forward, but it cannot retrieve or invalidate information already collected by an attacker.

That limitation matters for anyone who may have used an affected device to create or restore a wallet. Trezor explicitly warns that its update cannot protect a backup captured before installation. The company has not said that funds were taken from these three owners, but the absence of reported losses does not establish whether data was captured or whether an attacker has attempted to use it.

The incident also highlights a supply-chain risk: a device can be physically altered after leaving the manufacturer, while its firmware and security chip remain unchanged. Trezor’s description suggests that checks focused only on those components would not necessarily identify this particular implant. That is an interpretation of the reported design, not a claim that Trezor has said all device-integrity checks are ineffective.

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From Reseller Warning to Confirmation

Trezor removed CryptoBilis from its reseller network on October 9, 2026. The company says the move followed a separate investigation by Ledger into reported fund losses among customers who bought hardware wallets through the same Southeast Asian reseller. Ledger said on October 15 that its case involved “an attack on the distribution channel after the devices left our control.” That was Ledger’s account of its own incident; it does not establish that the Trezor owners lost funds.

On October 28, a Trezor customer in Indonesia reported an extra circuit board inside a Safe 5 bought from CryptoBilis through Tokopedia. Trezor warned customers on October 30, before its laboratory had examined the device, saying it did not want buyers to remain exposed while it waited for confirmation. The lab confirmation and identification of two further devices followed on November 12.

Trezor says it has cut its reseller network by about 80%. It is working with SEAL 911, the Security Alliance’s emergency response service. The company also says checks of devices from other resellers in the region have not found evidence of tampering so far.

““The update can’t protect a wallet backup that was captured before it.””

— Trezor

Exposure and Device Counts

The confirmed count is three individual Safe 5 devices, not three Trezor models. Trezor says 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward for checks, but the supplied information does not state how many of those checks are complete or whether further implants have been found. The company says other devices examined so far showed no tampering; that finding is limited to the devices checked.

It is also not clear whether the implants successfully transmitted recovery data from any of the three confirmed wallets, how long they were active, or whether anyone attempted to use captured information. Trezor reports no customer loss of funds from the three owners, but it has not provided an independent confirmation of the devices’ data transmissions or the attackers’ server activity. The identity of the attackers and the full number of affected devices remain unknown.

Checks and Firmware Rollout

Trezor says it is continuing checks on devices reported by CryptoBilis customers and working with SEAL 911. Owners of devices bought through that reseller should follow Trezor’s current guidance and install firmware 2.13.1 on supported devices. The update is listed for the Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T.

Further findings could change the confirmed device count or clarify whether captured information was transmitted. Trezor has not provided a final date for completing customer checks, and its current account does not establish whether any other devices or resellers were affected. The immediate distinction remains: the update is intended to block the implants Trezor has found, while any backup captured before the update requires separate attention.

Key Questions

What did Trezor find in the Safe 5 devices?

Trezor confirmed three Safe 5 devices with an added circuit board between the main board and screen. It says the board copied recovery words and passphrases displayed on the device and sent encrypted data over a mobile network.

Does firmware 2.13.1 fix the problem?

Trezor says firmware 2.13.1 blocks the implants it has found from capturing information on devices running the update. The company says it cannot protect a recovery backup captured before installation.

Have customers lost funds?

Trezor says none of the owners of the three confirmed devices has reported losing funds. The company has not said whether the implants successfully transmitted recovery data or whether an attacker tried to use it.

Which Trezor models are listed for the update?

Trezor’s changelog lists firmware 2.13.1 for the Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T, with a release date of November 11, 2026.

How many devices may be affected?

Trezor has confirmed three implanted Safe 5 devices. It says 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward to have devices checked, but the available information does not give a final count or say whether all checks are complete.

Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com

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