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TL;DR
Malicious JavaScript was delivered to visitors of 178 organizations through Optimizely’s web experimentation platform on Nov. 16, according to security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI. Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability and that it fixed the flaw and removed injected code. Researchers say the code attempted several forms of data theft and iPhone exploit delivery, but have not established that devices were compromised.
Malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organizations through Optimizely’s web experimentation platform on Nov. 16, according to security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI; Optimizely confirmed an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability to add code to some customer projects. The incident matters because visitors could receive the code from websites they trusted, including sites associated with Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC and Salesforce, without those organizations’ own systems necessarily being hacked.
Report URI says it checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found malicious code in 188. The report identifies 178 organizations affected and says the real total may be higher. These figures describe snippets and organizations, not necessarily 188 separate companies or every page and service operated by each listed organization. BleepingComputer independently reported that urlscan.io scans showed the script loading or attempting to load on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN and Salesforce.
The code was placed in an optional Optimizely feature called Project JavaScript, where customers can add custom code that runs on their pages, according to Report URI. The affected sites continued to load their snippets from Optimizely, a service they had chosen to trust. Report URI said the rest of each snippet was untouched and described the incident as not involving CDN cache poisoning.
Report URI says the script attempted to replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page text, form fields and clipboard contents; collect payment-card details entered into a site’s own form fields; and capture cookies and screenshots. It also attempted to direct some iPhones and iPads to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. The report says cards entered in hosted payment iframes, such as those used by Stripe or Adyen, were outside the code’s reach. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day, according to Report URI.
Optimizely script attack · Nov 13 – Nov 17, 2026
How one trusted script carried malware to 178 websites
The sites were not hacked themselves. The code arrived inside a file they loaded on purpose.
The route (schematic)
Whether any iPhone was compromised has not been shown.
Timeline (UTC)
- Nov 13Earlier wave through three other providers’ scriptsKissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media
- Nov 16 04:21First Optimizely injection seen
- 08:28Address-swapping payload first seen on a site
- 13:43Card skimmer added
- 17:13iPhone exploit delivery widened
- 19:24Report URI sweep: 186 of 1,611 snippets infected
- 21:52Only 1 of 188 infected snippets left
- 23:11All infected Optimizely files cleaned
- Nov 17 01:02Optimizely confirms the incident on its status page
Sources: Report URI (Scott Helme), Nov 16, 2026, timeline and update of Nov 17; Optimizely status page, Nov 17, 2026; Hudson Rock (Infostealers.com), Nov 16–17, 2026. The route is a schematic.
Graphic: Powered by Thorsten Meyer AI
How a Trusted Web Script Spread Risk
The incident shows how a compromise at a third-party provider can expose visitors across otherwise unrelated websites. Companies often use experimentation tools to test page layouts and content; because those tools run code within a customer’s site, an attacker who can alter a shared service may reach visitors without breaking into each customer separately. Here, the script was delivered through an address that affected sites already trusted.
For people who visited an affected page, the reported behavior could put information at risk depending on the page, device and actions taken. A wallet address copied while an affected tab was open could, according to Report URI, be replaced. Card details were at risk only when entered in the site’s own form fields, rather than a hosted payment iframe. Those are reported capabilities of the code, not confirmation that a particular visitor lost money or had an account taken over.
The scale also raises questions about how customer projects and third-party scripts are protected. Report URI checked security policies on affected organizations’ sites and found that 24 of 159 blocked the code, while 68 had no policy in place. Those counts are the researcher’s findings for the sites examined; they do not establish the security posture of every affected organization.
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How the Optimizely Snippets Worked
Optimizely Web is used to run experiments on websites. Each customer’s site loads a small JavaScript snippet from the platform. The snippet can carry experiment settings and optional customer-written Project JavaScript that runs on pages where the snippet is installed. Report URI says the attacker added code to that optional field in customer projects, leaving the remaining snippet intact.
According to Report URI, the first injected Optimizely file it observed appeared at 04:21 UTC on Nov. 16. It says all infected Optimizely files had been cleaned by 23:11 UTC that day, about 19 hours later. Optimizely’s status update, posted at 01:02 UTC on Nov. 17, said it had fixed the vulnerability and removed injected code from affected projects.
Report URI also described an earlier wave beginning Nov. 13, involving scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media on sites not included in the 178-organization list. Hudson Rock reported a similar pattern and said how the code entered those services remained unresolved. The available material does not establish that those earlier incidents used the same vulnerability as the Optimizely breach.
“An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.”
— Optimizely, in a status-page update posted Nov. 17
What the Investigation Has Not Established
Optimizely has said the flaw was in its Experimentation account signup flow, but the public statements cited by the source do not explain how that vulnerability allowed access to many unrelated customer projects. Report URI says it does not know how the attacker gained write access at that scale, while Hudson Rock says Optimizely’s disclosure does not explain the bug’s code-level mechanics.
It is also unclear how many visitors received the code, whether any data was successfully stolen, and whether anyone’s cryptocurrency or payment details were misused. The list of affected organizations does not mean every page, product, checkout flow or customer account was exposed. Hudson Rock specifically cautions that an affected subdomain does not establish exposure across an organization’s broader web presence.
For Apple devices, Report URI recommends updating to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. The source says those releases were already available months before the incident. Hudson Rock’s analysis concerns exploit delivery observations, not confirmed iPhone compromises. The number of affected organizations may also change: Report URI says its count could be an underestimate.
Customer Reviews and Further Findings
Optimizely said it had notified affected customers. The company also told BleepingComputer it had ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected user accounts. Further updates from Optimizely or independent researchers may clarify how the signup-flow vulnerability was abused, how many projects were changed and whether the attacker accessed customer information.
Organizations named in the report may need to review the specific subdomains and pages where their Optimizely snippets ran, along with any custom Project JavaScript and security-policy settings. Visitors who used an affected site should keep their devices and browsers updated and check relevant financial or cryptocurrency accounts for activity they do not recognize. The reporting does not establish that all visitors need to change account credentials or that any particular account was compromised.
Key Questions
What happened to the 178 organizations’ websites?
According to Report URI, malicious JavaScript was delivered to visitors through Optimizely snippets used by 178 organizations on Nov. 16. Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability to add code to some customer projects.
Does being on the list mean a company’s whole website was compromised?
No. The reported list can include individual subdomains, and an affected subdomain does not establish exposure across a company’s entire website, products, customer base or checkout system.
Were iPhones confirmed to be infected?
No confirmed iPhone compromises are established in the source material. Researchers observed code attempting to direct some iPhones and iPads to exploit kits; Hudson Rock characterized its findings as delivery observations, not demonstrated compromises.
What should visitors do now?
Keep devices updated and review relevant payment or cryptocurrency accounts for unfamiliar activity. Report URI advised updating Apple devices to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. The available reporting does not show that every visitor’s information was taken or that every account needs a password reset.
Has Optimizely explained how the attacker accessed customer projects?
Optimizely said the vulnerability was in the Experimentation account signup flow and that it fixed the issue, cleaned affected projects, and notified customers. The public statements described in the source do not explain how the flaw enabled access to unrelated customer projects.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
